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14. ABSTRACT U.S. planners can reasonably expect that the United States will continue to seek alliance and coalition partners to share the political and military risks associated with going to war. For the geographical combatant commander, participation in multinational logistics is not a choice. This paper will argue that U.S. geographical combatant commanders are organizationally and technically unprepared to conduct multinational logistics during post hostilities and peace keeping operations. This paper will recommend that the geographical combatant commanders formally establish their J4 as the office of primary responsibility for multinational logistics and create a Multinational Logistics Staff Section within the J4 at each geographical combatant command dedicated to multinational planning and operations. In addition, this paper will provide an overview of multinational logistics, including a "tool box" of multinational logistics arrangements that could benefit the combatant commanders, especially in hostile situations where the use of contractor support is not practical.					
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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI**

**Ready or Not...Here They Come: Are the Combatant Commanders Ready for
Multinational Logistics?**

By

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**A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction
of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

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Abstract

U.S. planners can reasonably expect that the United States will continue to seek alliance and coalition partners to share the political and military risks associated with going to war. For the geographical combatant commander, participation in multinational logistics is not a choice. This paper will argue that U.S. geographical combatant commanders are organizationally and technically unprepared to conduct multinational logistics during post hostilities and peace keeping operations. This paper will recommend that the geographical combatant commanders formally establish their J4 as the office of primary responsibility for multinational logistics and create a Multinational Logistics Staff Section within the J4 at each geographical combatant command dedicated to multinational planning and operations. In addition, this paper will provide an overview of multinational logistics, including a “tool box” of multinational logistics arrangements that could benefit the combatant commanders, especially in hostile situations where the use of contractor support is not practical.

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Introduction

In August 1999, military operators at Headquarters, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) in Stuttgart were busy launching peace keeping operations in Kosovo. EUCOM plans to deploy a force of over 7000¹ into the Army's newly constructed base camps were disrupted by important reports from the Department of State. Forces from the Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were being invited to participate in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) peace keeping mission. Not only would the Ukrainian and UAE forces fall in under the U.S. Commander in Multinational Brigade East, these foreign forces would be integrated into U.S. operations at Camp Bondsteel. U.S. operators would be required to support, from a cold start, 450 Ukrainian, UAE and Jordanian soldiers along with 10 aircraft and 130 vehicles.² For the next several years U.S. logisticians would support these foreign soldiers, who would live and work among American forces. This short notice deployment of Ukrainian and UAE forces illustrates the challenge of multinational logistics. U.S. operators do not have the luxury of choosing the time and location when they will work with coalition partners.

The this paper will argue that U.S. geographical combatant commanders are organizationally and technically unprepared to conduct multinational logistics during post hostilities and peace keeping operations; and that combatant commanders must develop multinational logistics planning and operational staff expertise within their J4 in order to assist Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders in their inevitable involvement with coalition forces. In addition, this paper will provide an overview of multinational logistics,

¹ John Pike, "Camp Bondsteel," 2002, <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-bondsteel.htm>>

² Merrifield, David. "NATO and Multinational Logistics," 2001

including a “tool box” of multinational logistics arrangements that could benefit the combatant commanders, especially in hostile situations where the use of contractor support is not practical.

U.S. Involvement in Coalitions

U.S. planners can reasonably expect that the United States will continue to seek alliance and coalition partners to share the political and military risks associated with going to war. The U.S. has participated in 30 such multinational operations since 1991.³ In nearly all of these operations the United States has provided or received support from coalition partners. Although the geographical combatant commanders may have been influential in convincing partner nations to participate in a coalition effort, their staff officers are not generally prepared to conduct the multinational logistics exchanges that followed. Multinational Logistics operations may result from U.S. involvement in an alliance or coalition action; including operations conducted under the backing of the United Nations.⁴ Partner nations bring to the fight a varying degree of military and logistics capabilities. Some allies, such as the NATO powers of France, Germany, and the U.K., have relatively robust military and logistics capabilities. Others come to the fight with far less. Often, coalition participation is driven by political rather than military considerations. It is frequently in the U.S political interest to invite small units of foreign forces into coalition operations even when they offer only a token force. For example, of the 34 countries participating in the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq, 25 nations have provided a force of less than 500 militarily personnel and ten of these have provided less

³ Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.Joint Pub 4-08(Washington, DC: 25 September 2002) I-2

⁴ Ibid.

than 100 personnel.⁵ These small multinational units normally require extensive coordination, integration and support by U.S. forces.

General Anthony Zinni, former CENTCOM Commander, describes the challenges of coalition operations. As Director of Operations, Unified Task Force, Somalia in 1992, he saw his coalition grow from 24 to 44 nations. Although he clearly understood the political benefit of a large membership, he also saw the military and logistics limitations. According to Zinni, some of the foreign forces in the Somali coalition were “just there to be there.” These troop contributing nations had very little organic lift, tactical transport or logistic capabilities. Although eager, they could not “self deploy” much beyond the Air Port of Debarkation, so Zinni assigned eight countries, far more than was required, to the mission of defending the airport. All the while, the U.S. provided the bulk of their logistic support.⁶ Zinni makes the point that the U.S. will continue to participate in these arrangements, and that joint officers should plan to support these coalition partners.

Sources of Logistic Support

Commanders can choose from three main sources to obtain logistics support. They can deploy organic military assets, employ military contractors or use multinational logistics support arrangements. It is crucial for the combatant commander to know the limitation of organic and contracted support because there will be times when they may not be available.

⁵ “Perspectives on World History and Current Events”. Coalition of the Willing. March 2003. <http://www.geocities.com> [15 May 2004].

⁶ Military Interaction with Non Military Agencies and Non Government Organizations. A Briefing by General Anthony Zinni to CIA, 6 Mar 1996.

Organic support is provided by active duty, reserve, and National Guard as well as civilian forces directly assigned to U.S. military forces. Organic support is especially important during the major combat phase of the operation. As operations move from combat operations to post hostilities and peace keeping operations, commanders may decide to reduce their military footprint by employing non-organic forces.

U.S. commanders conducting post hostilities or peace keeping operations are increasingly dependant on third party contracts, such as the Army Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program or LOGCAP for a wide variety of combat service support. LOGCAP is an external theater support contract designed as “an alternative to using service personnel for providing logistic support to deployed forces.”⁷ The LOGCAP contract, such as the Army’s current contract with Kellogg, Brown and Root, is designed to be used initially as a contingency planning tool. In times of crisis, the Army can activate LOGCAP, and the contractor will quickly begin providing a comprehensive array of preplanned logistics support. The Air Force has a similar program, Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP). The Navy has a construction capabilities contract called Construction Capabilities, CONCAP.⁸ These “cap” programs can give the commander a flexible option, and they can provide nearly all required logistics support, in all phases of the operation. However it is important to note that LOGCAP may have some inherent limitations in the areas of security, command and control, and legal status of contractors under SOFA, the Geneva Convention and UCMJ.

⁷ Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations. Joint Pub 4-08 (Washington, DC: 25 September 2002) III-10.

⁸ Higgins, Peter J. “Civilian Augmentation of Joint Operations.” Army Logistics Management College, January/February 2003. <<http://www.almc.army.mil/ALOG/issues/JanFeb03/MS870.htm>> [16 May 2004].

In addition to the LOGCAP umbrella contract, commanders have the flexibility to employ a large number of other smaller direct contracts for services such as translators, information management and weapons system maintenance. The total number of military contractors can make up a significant presence in theater, even in hostile environments like Iraq and Afghanistan.

A third and critical source of logistics support can be obtained from the coalition and host nation militaries. Multinational logistics allows for a variety of flexible arrangements where coalition partners can provide such diverse services as strategic lift, transportation, movement control, laundry and dining facilities and most classes of supply to include bulk fuel and small arms ammunition. Host nation militaries can grant the essential permission for the U.S. to operate in ports, airfields, rail networks and assembly areas. In addition the host nation can allow the U.S. to use fuel pipelines and other indispensable logistics infrastructures.

The art of logistics is the balancing of organic, contracted, and multinational support. The combatant commander's staff must know the benefit and limitation of each as well as the legal obstacles associated with their use.

Multinational Logistics and Legal Authority

The time tested doctrine of “logistics as a national responsibility” was challenged in 1992 by NATO as it wrestled with its new post cold war responsibilities. NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics MC 319, introduced the new concept of logistics as a collective responsibility of member nations and the multinational force commander.⁹ NATO changed its logistics doctrine in order to support its emerging requirement to

⁹ “NATO Logistics Handbook.” Multinational Logistics. October 1997. <<http://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/1997/lo-1301.htm>>. [1 May 2004]. 13-1301.

deploy forces out of sector, first to the Balkans and later to Afghanistan. In publishing Joint Publication 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations, the U.S Joint Staff has made a great effort to conform U.S. doctrine to NATO policy.

According to Joint Publications 4-08, multinational logistics is defined as “any coordinated logistic activity involving two or more nations supporting a multinational force conducting military operations under the auspices of an alliance or coalition, including those conducted under the United Nations (UN) mandate.” Multinational logistics may include both logistics units provided by partner nations designated for use by the multinational force commander as well as a variety of multinational logistics support arrangements that may be developed and used by participating forces.¹⁰

For the purpose of this paper, multinational logistics is the process that allows for the legal exchange and cross-servicing of supplies, maintenance, transportation, engineering, medical and other services between the United States and coalition partners, the host nation and eligible international organizations. The U.S. can either provide or receive support. Exchanges can be deliberately planned or ad hoc. Multinational logistics operations are not only concerned with the procedural process of exchanging support but also with obtaining the proper legal authority and appropriate financial reimbursement for services. For the purposes of this paper, discussions are limited to multinational logistic support during post hostilities and peace keeping operations.

The management of multinational logistics operations has two distinct parts: the first is concerned with the procedures deemed necessary to obtain the required support.

¹⁰ Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.Joint Pub 4-08(Washington, DC: 25 September 2002) I-2.

The second and often overlooked piece is the legal authority or permission needed to conduct multinational transfers.

The guiding principal of multinational logistics is that all support provided by the U.S. forces to other militaries must be reimbursed. The legal authority to exchange support with multinational partners rests with bilateral agreements such as Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSA). Legal authority is required to exchange support. U.S. Commanders are in violation of the Federal Purpose Statute, and the Anti-deficiency Act, if they provide support to another nation without legal authority and without getting agreement in advance for reimbursement.¹¹

Currently there are ACSA agreements with 79 countries as well as several NATO organizations.¹² Signing the bi-lateral agreement between the U.S. combatant commander and Ministry of Defense of the partner nation does not commit either party to providing any future support. However it does provide permission to conduct logistic exchanges. Once a bilateral ACSA agreement is in place, it is an easy tool for deployed commanders to use. The ordering process is simple and reimbursement may be provided in cash, by replacement-in-kind or equal value exchange. No funds or services are committed until an actual ACSA order is placed.

In addition to ACSA, support can be exchanged under the authority of Foreign Military Sales. U.S. commanders can also purchase support under the Federal Acquisition Regulation. However, the most expedient legal authority for exchange is the ACSA program.

¹¹ Merrifield, David. "NATO and Multinational Logistics," 2001.

¹² Munley, Judyann. "Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements, 9 Nov 1999. (Note: per phone call with LTC Talley, the number of current signed ACSA agreements is 77).

Keeping U.S. combatant and JTF commanders within the limits of the law during logistics transfers is a major responsibility of not only the combatant commanders' Judge Advocate but professional logistic officers as well.

The “Tool Box” of Multinational Logistics

Multinational logistics planning, when conducted properly, has clear benefits to U.S. combatant commanders. Multinational logistics planning allows commanders to be responsive while at the same time maintaining a limited national footprint. U.S. combatant commanders and JTF commanders can take advantage of a variety of preplanned multinational support arrangements that provide required support while at the same time reducing national force structure. By participating in a multinational force generation process, coalition members can agree to lead or participate in a variety of support arrangements. These arrangements are the pillars of multinational support and they include:

- Lead Nation (LN) logistic support. One nation assumes the responsibility for procuring and providing a broad spectrum of logistics support for all or a part of a multinational force. Compensation and reimbursement will then be subject to agreements of the parties involved.¹³ The U.S. provided lead nation logistic support to coalition partners in Somalia and Haiti.¹⁴
- Role Specialist Nation (RSN). One nation assumes the responsibility for procuring a particular class of supply or service for all or part of a multinational force.

¹³ NATO Logistics Handbook. “Multinational Logistics.” October 1997. <http://www.nato.int/docu/logien/1997/lo-1316.htm> 13-1319.

¹⁴ Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations. Joint Pub 4-08(Washington, DC: 25 September 2002) III-4.

Compensation and reimbursement will be subject to agreement to the parties involved.¹⁵

Since 1999, France has served as RSN for bulk fuel for Kosovo Force (KFOR).¹⁶

- National Logistics Units. Individual nations can provide to a coalition a particular logistic unit such as engineer battalions or a composite logistic unit that perform several logistic functions, such as medical transportation and engineer units.¹⁷

- Theater Support Units. Two or more nations agree to provide logistics assets to a multinational logistics force under operational control of a NATO commander for the logistic support of a multinational force.¹⁸ In 1997, Greece, Bulgaria, and Austria combined to form HELBA, providing theater wide transportation support to multinational Stabilization Force (SFOR), Bosnia.¹⁹

- Host Nation Support (HNS). Support from the host nation on its territory. HNS is civil and military assistance rendered in peace and war by a host nation to allied forces and NATO organizations which are located in or transit through the host nation's territory.²⁰ Saudi Arabia provided extensive HNS during Operation Desert Storm including the use of airports and seaports, port operations, transportation, fuel, water and rations.²¹

¹⁵ NATO Logistics Handbook. "Multinational Logistics." October 1997. <http://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/1997/lo-1316.htm> 13-1320.

¹⁶ Pope, Richard. U.S. Army, G4 Petroleum Briefing. May 2003. U.S. Army G4.

¹⁷ Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations. Joint Pub 4-08(Washington, DC: 25 September 2002). III-7.

¹⁸ Merrifield, David. "NATO and Multinational Logistics," 2001

¹⁹ Pina, Juan A. "HELBA." Multinational Integrated Logistic Unit, SFOR Informer Online, 1 March 2001. <<http://nato.int/sfor/sfor-at-work/helba2/t000302h.htm>> [15 May 2004].

²⁰ NATO Logistics Handbook. "Annex A - Definitions" October 1997. <http://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/1997/defini.htm>

²¹ Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations Joint Pub 4-08(Washington, DC: 25 September 2002).III-4.

- Multinational Contracting Support. The U.S. can use its national contracting capabilities to provide support to other coalition militaries. In addition, the U.S. and coalition partners may arrange for external contracting support for common logistic supplies and services to the entire multinational force, including the U.S.²²

- Ad Hoc logistics arrangements are unplanned or emergency support, such as in the case of U.S. support of Ukraine and UAE.

Arguments Pro: U.S. Geographical Combatant Commanders are organizationally and technically unprepared to conduct multinational logistics.

No Single Point of Contact: Geographical combatant commander's staff sections are not currently structured to support complex multinational logistics tasking. There is little command emphasis on multinational logistics. Although the J4 is often tasked to serve as the functional staff section responsible for multinational logistics, the J4 does not take responsibility for overall coordination across the combatant commander's staff.

What is missing in all of the geographical commands is a single office that directs multinational logistics plans and operation throughout the command. There is no central office that serves as focal point on multinational issues concerning logistics, medical, engineering, legal, and resource management. Most multinational issues are not solvable by a single numbered J staff; most require coordination across the command staff.

Important actions, some with international consequence, often get “bounced” between the J4, resource management, facility engineers and the office of the surgeon because no one is the clear proponent for multinational logistics.

Planning is fractured: The combatant commander's planning, both deliberate and crisis planning is almost exclusively national. Joint OPLANS are often published with

²² Ibid.III-11.

the important Host Nation and Multinational Support Annexes left “to be published at a later date”, because no staff section takes overall responsibility. When the J4 staff takes the initiative on multinational logistics plans, they lack the authority to task other staff sections to complete necessary work, and because no single J-staff flag officer is responsible for the entire spectrum of multinational logistics, command emphasis of multinational logistics matters is often lacking. When planning logistics support to multinational operations, joint planners seem to believe that having a signed ACSA agreement can substitute for deliberate planning. Joint planners seem to avoid the use of other multinational planning tools such as lead nation and role specialist nation arrangements.

Components Staff Problems: The relationship between the combatant command staff and their subordinate component commands in the Army, Marines, Air Force and SOFA is absolutely critical to the success of multinational logistics operations. Unfortunately, these relationships are often dysfunctional. One problem is the multinational logistics responsibilities at the component level are also spread across functions in the G3, G4, Resource Management, Office of the Judge Advocate and engineers. This organization structure makes problem solving nearly impossible as a variety of staff officers from the component staff coordinate with their combatant command staff. Component staff officers also coordinate the action with their higher headquarters, such as the Army component contacting the Department of the Army. Components also coordinate with their sister services when applicable.

Little Oversight of Components: Combatant command staffs often take a “hands off” approach on operational multinational logistics matters. This approach can lead to a

dysfunctional division of labor, with the combatant commander staff working to negotiate routine template ACSA agreements, while the component staffs work complex multi-million dollar arrangements with numerous multinational partners. Because the component commands are tasked with Title X responsibilities and are funded to equip and sustain their forces, combatant commander staffs often allow components free rein to coordinate directly with foreign military officials. It is not unusual to see component personnel in the rank of Major or perhaps civilian GS-12 dealing directly with senior officers at foreign ministries of defense.

Little Oversight of JTFs: A similar staff disconnect often exists between the combatant commander's staff and the deployed JTF. The JTF does not deploy with built in multinational logistics expertise, and this mission is often assumed by an overworked supply officer at the O3 pay grade. The young officer will need guidance from higher headquarters on how to, and when not to, exchange support with coalition forces. The six month rotation schedule of U.S. and coalition partners also adds to the loss in expertise in multinational logistics.

Multinational logistics functions remain disjointed at the combatant commander's staff level. As a result, these staff sections do not gain the required situational awareness to become subject matter experts in the field of multinational logistics operations.

Arguments CON

Others will argue that because the U.S. does not benefit from participation in multinational logistics operations, the U.S. does not need extensive coordination at the combatant commander's staff level.

Many U.S. officers see multinational logistics as nothing more than a drag on U.S. national assets by other militaries that do not have robust capabilities. Combatant commanders do not need to put an increased effort in the area of multinational logistics. The U.S. has considerable organic capabilities that can be augmented by minimum HNS. As major combat operations wind down, LOGCAP and other contractors can easily provide increasing support, allowing the active force to return to peacetime missions.

Why does the U.S. favor this national stovepipe approach? Some would argue that the U.S. has a large CSS force structure, augmented as required by contractors. U.S. commanders at all levels want the best for the troops; this is certainly true in terms of food, medical treatment and evacuation. U.S. leaders want their force supported at the highest U.S. standards, not by lower foreign standards. U.S. commanders want immediate support; they do not want to have to behave diplomatically when coalition partners deliver late and sub-standard service.

For these reasons, the argument will be made that the United States should choose a national approach. Many professional logistics officers do not accept the concept outlined in JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistics Support to Multinational Operations, that “logistics support of multinational operations is both a collective and individual national responsibility of the participating nations and the MNFC.”²³ They also would take umbrage with the JP 4-08 guidance that “the MNFC must be given sufficient authority over logistics resources to ensure that operational priorities can be effectively supported.”²⁴

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²³ Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.Joint Pub 4-08(Washington, DC: 25 September 2002). I-7

²⁴ Ibid.

The very real concern in multinational logistics is that the U.S. will become the major supplier of strategic lift, ground transportation, base operations, medical and other support to a large number of coalition partners. For this reason, it makes sense not to participate in any multinational logistics arrangements, other than the minimal HNS. Advocates of a purely national approach will argue that “this is the way we have operated since the birth of our nation.”²⁵ The U.S. has a huge force, with complex systems, with the capacity to support forces at American standards. Because it is not to U.S. benefit to participate in multinational logistics operations, we need not devote an extensive effort developing multinational logistics planning and operational staff expertise.

Rebuttal of Con

The decision to invite foreign forces to participate in coalition operations is not made by the JTF commander, nor is it likely to be made by the combatant commander, although both may have input into the decision. The make up of a coalition will not be determined by the logistic professionals. The decision is often made in the political realm; therefore, the combatant commander’s staff has to have the resident expertise to support short notice deployments of foreign forces to U.S. operations.

The Russian involvement in KFOR provides insight. In 1999, Russian forces were assigned to the U.S. sectors in Kosovo. Russian forces provided the vast majority of their own support. However, the U.S. did provide limited dining facility, medical and barrier material. In addition, Russian liaison officers lived and worked on U.S. base camps and consumed U. S. support. Russian forces served well in this mission and some lost their lives. But the U.S. and Russia do not have a signed ACSA agreement and U.S.

²⁵Spidel, Robert J. Multinational Logistic in NATO: Will It Work? U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. 15 April 1996.

commanders had no legal authority to provide support. An investigation was begun in order to determine why Russians were supported in violation of public law.

Recommendations

For the geographical combatant commander, participation in multinational logistics is not a choice. The combatant commander needs to develop multinational logistics staff expertise to assist JTF commanders and the components in their inevitable involvement with coalition forces. This staff expertise should be developed as follows:

1. Formally establish the J4 as the office of primary responsibility for multinational logistics. Create a Multinational Logistics staff section within the J4 at each geographical combatant command dedicated to multinational planning and operations. This staff section would provide the commander and the J4 a “single necktie to grab” on matters concerning multinational logistics support, whether they be medical, logistics, engineering, funding or legal issues. The J4 must be authorized appropriate tasking authority to complete this mission. This Multinational Logistics staff section would coordinate with components, deployed JTFs, the Joint Staff, other DoD and federal agencies and most importantly their potential coalition partners. In commands where this function already exists in some form, the J4 needs to insure that this section meets the entire requirement discussed below.

2. Expand bilateral and multilateral engagement with allies and potential coalition partners in the area of multinational logistics. This could be done by expanding bi-lateral planning with established alliances such as NATO and ANZUS as well as increased engagement with non-allied potential partners. Once multilateral engagement

has begun, small multinational exercises can be conducted to test proposed multinational solutions and arrangements.

3. The J4 Multinational Logistics staff section should take the theater wide lead on multinational logistics planning. The staff should be proactive, and not just act in response to crisis situations. Staff officers should use the entire toolbox of multinational logistics arrangements to include: lead nation, role specialist nation, host nation support and multinational contracting support. The J4 should insure that multinational planning is reinforced in the commander's guidance section of the JSCAP process.

4. Conduct extensive training in multinational logistics. Annual training would be provided for all headquarters and component logistics staff officers. The J4 should conduct an annual multinational logistics conference to discuss regional issues with concerned U.S. and foreign partners. The J4 should conduct numerous staff assistance visits to deployed JTFs in the AOR. In addition, the J4 would encourage expansion of courses such as the Army Multinational Logistics Course, offered at Fort Lee.

5. Establish a Multinational Support Cell (MNSC) in the deployed JTF J4. The MNSC will serve as the entry point for deployed coalition partners seeking support from the U.S. military in theater. The MNSC will administer exchange of logistics support between the Task Force and troop contributing nations of the coalition. The MNSC will assure the collection and processing of appropriate documents such as dining facilities headcount sheets, and fuel and laundry issue documents. The MNSC will oversee reimbursement and payment of bills from troop contributing nations and assure that legal authority is clearly established. The J4 will assure that the deployed MNSC is trained and staffed to the appropriate level and led by a field grade officer or civilian equivalent.

It is imperative that the J4 multinational logistics staff section keep its collective finger on the pulse of multinational operations in order to assist JTFs and components with day to day multinational logistics operations.

Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated that U.S. geographical combatant commanders are organizationally and technically unprepared to deal with the complex challenge of multinational logistics. This paper offers a simple yet potentially productive solution to this serious problem; have the combatant commander designate the J4 as the office of primary responsibility for all aspects of multinational logistics. Failure to have a single point of expertise will result in improper and illegal exchanges of support which can result in a potential international calamity.

The field of multinational logistics is evolving and improving. The publication of JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistics Support to Multinational Operations has done much to provide overarching guidance to commanders and professional logisticians. The combatant commander's staffs are improving in this area; however they are currently placing considerable effort on ACSA negotiations at the expense of more deliberate planning and engagement activities.

As was stated, the operational art of logistics is the intuitive balancing of organic, contracted, and multinational support. The technical and intuitive skill is recognizing how, when and in what combination to use these three tools.

The horrific death of Nicholas Berg as well as the recent capture and escape of Thomas Hamill raise the important question of the safety of the contractors on the battlefield. What does the combatant commander do if contractor support is not feasible

in future hostile environments? Should we increase the OPTEMPO of an already overburdened active duty and reserve CSS corps?

The answer just may be to employ a multinational logistics solution. The combatant commander's J4; with newly established resident expertise could apply the art of multinational logistics in order to create a new approach. Perhaps the solution could be lead nation or roles, specialist nation, or perhaps a multinational approach to contracting. The challenge is now passed to the combatant commander and his J4 to provide the organizational and technical skills to meet the inevitable multinational logistics challenges certain to be found in the next operation.

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